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relation to European law in the area of overland transport. Switzerland chose instruments to 
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I. Introduction  
The present article addresses two areas of concern: a) mountain protection in Switzerland in 
toto and b) its relation to European law. Certain delimitations can be made concerning the 
second part of the subject since European law – meant here as European Union law (EU law) 
– does not interfere in all aspects of the Swiss law on mountain protection. We choose to 
focus on the area of overland transport, where Switzerland is bound to large parts to European 
law. The relevant bilateral agreement between Switzerland and the European Union includes 
obligations already set out in EU law as well as autonomous obligations. In this respect, 
Switzerland chose instruments to limit road traffic for the transport of goods that are rather 
unique in the European context. Switzerland also develops a new instrument, the “Alpine 
Transit Bourse” (“Alpentransitbörse”, ATB). In order to be effective, the ATB should also be 
adopted by the other Alpine countries which are Member States of the EU. The question we 
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would like to discuss addresses the dimension of the instrument and the compatibility of the 
ATB with EU law.  
In the following contribution we shall deal with two instruments, whereas the first one is in 
existence and the second at the stage of planning in Swiss law: The performance-related toll 
for heavy goods vehicles toll (PRTHV) (leistungsabhängige Schwerverkehrsabgabe, LSVA) 
(III.) and the mentioned Alpine Transit Bourse (IV.), the emphasis being put on the latter. 
Both mechanisms aim at reducing road traffic as far as the transport of goods is concerned. 
The disciplines imposed by EU law constitute the framework for the analysis of these 
instruments as far as they influence Swiss law (II.). Special attention will also be given to the 
Bilateral Agreement on overland transport (Overland Transport Agreement – OTA). The 
contribution finishes with some reflections on the transport of goods as a challenge of 
mountain protection (V.).   
It is interesting to note that there are no particular legal instruments for environmental protection in Switzerland, 
although the general Swiss legislation equally applies to mountain areas. The sufficiency of such legislative 
management for the protection of mountain areas with regard to land planning (limitation or regulation of new 
constructions) may be doubted. However, the law on nature protection
1
 and the regulations derived from this 
legislative act provide for the protection of certain areas determined by a decision of the Federal Government, a 
concept similar to that of the European Directive on Habitats
2
.  
Furthermore, Swiss legislation is compatible with the prerogatives of EU law, except for certain aspects of 
public participation. The ratification of the protocols of the Alpine Convention should – from a legal point of 
view – not affect existing Swiss law because of the large margin of appreciation which the texts leave to Member 
States.  
II. Forms of Europeanisation of Swiss law, in particular the Bilateral Agreement on 
Overland Transport  
1. General aspects3 
Swiss Law is influenced in various ways by EU law – the legal effects are different in every 
scenario. There are four forms of ‘inspiration’ of the Swiss law by EU law:  
- ‘Autonomous adaptation’: Since Switzerland and the European Union and its Member 
States maintain a close cooperation in economic relations,4 the Swiss legislator often 
finds inspiration in EU legislation and approximates its domestic legislation to EU law 
and in particular to EU directives, without being, however, obliged to do so. In this 
sense, the decision to ‘copy’ EU Law is an ‘autonomous’ decision. For this reason the 
technique is often referred to as ‘autonomous adaptation’ (‘autonomer Nachvollzug’).5 
                                                 
1
  Cf. Bundesgesetz über den Natur- und Heimatschutz, SR 451. 
2  Dir. 79/409 on the conservation of wild birds, OJ L 103 of 24.4.1979, 1, last modified by Dir. 2006/105, 
OJ L 363 of 20.12.2006, 368; Dir. 92/43 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and 
flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, 7, last modified by Dir. 2006/105, OJ L 363 of 20.12.2006, 368.   
3
  This chapter is mainly based on: Astrid Epiney, How does European Union Law Influence Swiss Law and 
Policies?, in: Stéphane Nahrath/Frédéric Varone (eds.), Rediscovering Public Law and Public 
Administration in Comparative Policy Analysis: a Tribute to Peter Knoepfel, Contributions à l’action 
publique, Lausanne, 2009, 179 et seq. 
4
  Cf. to this issue Rolf Weder, Swiss international economic relations: assessing a small and open 
economy, in: Clive H. Church (ed.), Switzerland and the European Union : a close, contradictory and 
misunderstood relationship, Routledge, London/New York, 2007, 99 et seq.; Clive H. Church/Christina 
Severin/Bettina Hurni, Sectors, structures and suspicions: financial and other aspects of Swiss economic 
relations with the EU, in: Clive H. Church (ed.), Switzerland and the European Union: a close, 
contradictory and misunderstood relationship, Routledge, London/New York, 2007, 126 et seq. 
5
  Cf. Matthias Amgwerd, Autonomer Nachvollzug von EU-Recht durch die Schweiz: Unter spezieller 
Berücksichtigung des Kartellrechts, Europainstitut an der Universität Basel, 1998; Bruno Spinner/Daniel 
Maritz, EG-Kompatibilität des schweizerischen Wirtschaftsrechts: Vom autonomen zum systematischen 
Nachvollzug, in: Peter Forstmoser (ed.), Der Einfluss des europäischen Rechts auf die Schweiz, 
 3 
The voluntary approximation to EU Law is most often based on economic motives: the 
aim is to avoid economic problems resulting from differences in the legislation between 
the EU and Switzerland.6 The technique is mainly used in areas where transnational 
economic relations are important. However, it raises questions of interpretation, e.g. 
whether the act should be construed by the national judiciary in conformity with EU law 
and the rulings of the European Court of Justice. Moreover, it is unclear to what extent 
legislative developments or developments in the case-law ought to be taken into account 
if the answer is affirmative.7 
An ‘autonomous adaptation’ raises a number of questions about the true autonomous character of this 
technique: in situations where it is deemed necessary to adapt Swiss legislation to EU standards, 
Switzerland reproduces EU legislation, although it was not involved in its adoption.
8
 The situation is – 
from a political point of view – only defendable if the process applies to technical matters and/or is 
restricted to a narrow field of application. In many areas of technical character, Swiss legislation includes 
delegations that allow the government to adopt legislative acts that reproduce developments in EULaw.
9
 
- International treaties: International agreements may include obligations for 
Switzerland to ensure equivalent legislation with respect to a part of the acquis. 
Switzerland concluded over a hundred treaties with the EU. Apart from the Agreement 
on Free Trade from 1972 the most important treaties are the so-called Bilateral 
Agreements from 1999 and 200410. An international agreement is – from a Swiss point 
                                                                                                                                                        
Festschrift für Roger Zäch, Schulthess, Zürich, 1999, 127 et seq.; Astrid Epiney/Annekathrin 
Meier/Robert Mosters, Die Kantone zwischen EU-Beitritt und ‚Bilateralem Weg’. Bewertung 
ausgewählter europapolitischer Optionen aus rechtlicher Sicht, in: Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen 
(ed.), Zwischen EU-Beitritt und bilateralem Weg: Überlegungen und Reformbedarf aus kantonaler Sicht. 
Expertenberichte im Auftrag der Arbeitsgruppe ‚Europa – Reformen der Kantone’, Zürich, 2006, 77 (85 
et seq.).  
6
  The inspiration of Swiss law by EU legislation has been explicitly pointed out in a report of the Swiss 
government in 1988. The report insisted that the economic future of Switzerland is largely dependant on a 
domestic legislation that is as ‘eurocompatible’ as possible., cf. Bericht des Bundesrates über die Stellung 
der Schweiz im europäischen Integrationsprozess vom 24.8.1988, BBl 1988 III 249 (380). This is the 
background for the fact that each ‘message’ (a sort of preparatory document elaborated by the Swiss 
Government in the legislation process) includes a chapter assessing the compatibility of the envisaged act 
with the EU law and sometimes also with the national law of important Member States, especially the 
neighbouring countries (Germany, France, Italy, Austria). 
7
  Cf. Marc Amstutz, Interpretation multiplex. Zur Europäisierung des schweizerischen Privatrechts im 
Spiegel von BGE 129 III 335, in: Heinrich Honsell (ed.), Privatrecht und Methode: Festschrift für Ernst 
A. Kramer, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel, 2004, 67 et seq. 
8
  Cf. Karine Siegwart, “Das Europa-Fenster in URP“, URP/DEP 2004, 266 et seq.; Oliver Diggelmann, 
Der liberale Verfassungsstaat und die Internationalisierung der Politik: Veränderungen von Staat und 
Demokratie in der Schweiz, Stämpfli, Bern, 2005, 114 et seq. 
9
  Cf. Astrid Epiney/Nathalie Schneider, “Zu den Implikationen des gemeinschaftlichen Umweltrechts in 
der Schweiz“, EurUP 2004, 308 et seq.) 
10
  Cf. the text of these agreements in OJ 2002 L 114, 1 et seq. = BBl 1999 6489 et seq.; BBl 2004 5965 et 
seq. Cf. to these agreements Daniel Felder/Christine Kaddous (eds.), Accords bilatéraux Suisse – UE 
(Commentaires)/Bilaterale Abkommen Schweiz – EU (Erste Analysen), Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 
Bâle/Genève/Munich, 2001; Christine Kaddous/Monique Jametti Greiner (eds.), Accords bilatéraux II 
Suisse – UE et autres Accords récents/Bilaterale Abkommen II Schweiz – EU und andere neue 
Abkommen, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Genève/Bâle/Munich, 2006; Thomas Cottier/Matthias Oesch (eds.), 
Die sektoriellen Abkommen Schweiz – EG: Ausgewählte Fragen zur Rezeption und Umsetzung der 
Verträge vom 21. Juni 1999 im schweizerischen Recht, Stämpfli, Bern, 2002; Daniel Thürer/Rolf H. 
Weber/Roger Zäch (eds.), Bilaterale Verträge Schweiz – EG – ein Handbuch, Schulthess, Zürich, 2002; 
Daniel Thürer/Rolf H. Weber/Wolfgang Portmann/Andreas Kellerhals (eds.), Bilaterale Verträge I & II 
Schweiz – EU – ein Handbuch, Schulthess, Zürich/Basel/Genf, 2007; Stephan Breitenmoser, “Sectoral 
agreements between the EC and Switzerland: Contents and Context“, CMLRev 2003, 1137 et seq.; 
Christine Kaddous, The relations between the EU and Switzerland, in: Alan Dashwood/Marc Maresceau 
(eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape , 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, 227 et seq. (230 et seq.). 
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of view – necessary in situations where the autonomous way does not lead to the desired 
results. Several scenarios can be distinguished: 
- Switzerland wishes to participate in an EU agency. For instance, the participation 
of Switzerland in the European Environmental Agency was only possible after the 
conclusion of a bilateral agreement (in 2004).  
- Recognition of Swiss decisions by the EU or its Member States is desired. An 
international agreement is, thus, necessary to establish an obligation of 
recognition. The participation in a EU-system such as the CO2-emission trading 
scheme needs for instance to be regulated in an international treaty. Otherwise the 
EU would not recognise Swiss CO2-emission rights. Similarly, in cases where EU 
Law lays down an obligation for Member States to introduce a system of 
administrative control – for example before a product will be admitted to the single 
market –  only an agreement can ensure that Swiss controls are recognised as 
equivalent to those in EU Member States. 
- Finally, an international agreement can be indispensable to guarantee a right to 
market access. There are agreements e.g. in the areas of free movement of persons 
or of air transport. We will discuss the Overland Transport Agreement in more 
detail below.11 
 In all cases, Switzerland as a third country will never be allowed to participate in the 
decision-making process at EU-level; there are good reasons supporting the argument 
that Swiss participation would not even be compatible with the EC Treaty, even if it 
were only participation in the decision-making of an agency (if the agency has 
governmental authority).12 
- Comparative law method: Swiss legislation and Swiss decisions are often influenced 
by legal processes in other countries and the EU. In this context, EU law can be 
considered as a source of inspiration. Before adopting a legislative act the legislator 
evaluates the corresponding legal developments in the EU (and often in other countries, 
preferably in important Member States of the EU) to be inspired by certain aspects of 
that legislation. 
The Swiss Federal Court (‘Bundesgericht’) sometimes refers to the EU case law when interpreting Swiss 
law. The method is applied to economic areas of law and generally in cases where the legal problems and 
solutions in Swiss and EU law seem to be similar. The Federal Court applied the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women as far as affirmative action is concerned in the same way as the 
European Court of Justice.
13
 The referral sometimes creates problems from a methodical point of view: 
the Federal Court seems to adopt a more pragmatic interpretative strategy, without really analysing if the 
conditions and situations are given where a solution applied by the European Court of Justice could 
equally be useful with regard to a problem in the Swiss law. In our view, such a reference is only 
acceptable in conditions where the context, the systematic and the aim of the legal provision are truly the 
‘same’ in Swiss and in EU law. It is definitely not adequate to refer to a ruling of the ECJ and continue 
with a remark that there is no reason not to apply the same principles.  
- ‘Harmonisation’ by multilateral international treaties: It is worth remembering that 
Switzerland and the EU (and its Member States) are parties of a number of multilateral 
agreements such as the Alpine Convention. These treaties include a certain number of 
                                                 
11
  II.2. 
12
  ECJ, opinion 1/91 (EEA), ECR 1991, I-6079; cf. to this issue Astrid Epiney/Silvana Schnider, “Die 
Europäische Umweltagentur: Eine neue „Einrichtung“ der EG und ihre Bedeutung für die Schweiz“, 
URP/DEP 1995, 39 et seq. 
13
  ECJ, C-450/93 (Kalanke), ECR 1995, I-3051 and BGE 123 I 152; ECJ, C-409/95 (Marschall), ECR 1997, 
I-6363 and BGE 125 I 21.   
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obligations that must be transformed into national (or supranational) law. As parties of 
the same agreements, the EU and Switzerland are bound to the same obligations. In this 
sense, international law contributes to ‘harmonise’ Swiss law with EU law. Examples in 
the area of environmental protection demonstrate such a legislative coordination.14 
The agreement on the participation of Switzerland at the European Environmental Agency 
from 2004 is the only agreement between the EU and Switzerland which touches at least 
theoretically upon environmental law in general and mountain protection in particular. 
There are suggestions that Switzerland should participate in the CO2-emissions trading 
scheme. In other areas of environmental law Switzerland is not yet bound to EUlegislation. 
The situation may change with the conclusion of other bilateral agreements, e.g. in the area of 
electricity or free trade in agricultural products.15 However, there exists a bilateral agreement 
on rail and road transport that integrates Switzerland into the relevant acquis. The Agreement 
also includes certain autonomous articles.  Their legal implications for environmental 
protection are often limited.  
2. The Overland Transport Agreement  
The Overland Transport Agreement (Landverkehrsabkommen – LVA) and the Free Trade 





 is very strong in these areas: Whereas Switzerland was 
aiming and continues to aim at a reduction of the transport volume in the Alps, the EU’s main 
interest is the undisturbed transit through Switzerland including the free movement of goods 
and the free provision of services.  
After the rejection of the agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) in the 1992 referendum, Switzerland 
concluded two ‘packages’ of bilateral and sectoral18 agreements with the European Union and (in some cases) 
with certain Member States. Since the EEA could not enter into force for Switzerland, the aim of the agreements 
was to ensure the participation of Switzerland in parts of the integration process within the framework of the 
European Union.  
The so-called ‘Bilateral I’ agreements entered into force in 2002. They include seven agreements in public 
procurement, technical barriers to trade, research, road and rail transport, air transport, agriculture and free 
movement of persons. The seven agreements form a ‘package’ insofar as they are interconnected by a so-called 
‘guillotine clause’: They can only collectively enter into force. The non-prolongation or cancellation of a single 
agreement would result into the abrogation of all other agreements. From an institutional point of view, however, 
                                                 
14
  As example, one can refer to the Convention of Aarhus on environmental information, participation and 
access to justice (which Switzerland has not yet ratified) or the Convention on environmental impact 
assessment with the protocole of Kiev. Cf. in detail with some (more) examples and references 
Epiney/Schneider, EurUP 2004 (note 9), 308 (314 et seq.). 
15
  Cf. Astrid Epiney/David Furger/Jennifer Heuck, Zur Berücksichtigung umweltpolitischer Belange bei der 
landwirtschaftlichen Produktion in der EU und in der Schweiz: ein Vergleich unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Implikationen eines Freihandelsabkommens im Agrar- und Lebensmittelbereich, 
Schulthess, Zürich, 2009.  
16
 Individual interests of the Member States were playing a decisive role: France and Austria wanted to 
reshift the traffic, that was diverted to France and Austria because of the 28 ton limit introduced by 
Switzerland; Germany and Italy were interested in finding a solution providing a minimum of costs.  
17
 Cf. Karine Siegwart/Reto Gruber/Michael Beusch, “Stand und Perspektiven der Umsetzung des 
Alpenschutz-Artikels (Art. 36
sexies
 BV) unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Raum- und 
Umweltplanung“, Aktuelle Juristische Praxis (AJP) 1998, 1033 (1034-1035); Astrid Epiney, Die 
Beziehungen der Schweiz zur Europäischen Union, dargestellt am Beispiel des Alpentransits , Zentrum für 
Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht, Vorträge und Berichte, Bonn, 1996, 12 et seq. 
18
  The notion of ‘bilateral agreements’ contrasts  the multilateral approach of the agreements. From a legal 
point of view, the term ‘bilateral’ is imprecise because the agreements are partially multilateral (when the 
Member States are parties of the agreement). The term ‘sectoral agreement’ describes the legal position 
more precisely. It refers to the fact that each agreement addresses a specific area. We use the term 
‘bilateral agreements’ as it has become the notion most commonly used. 
 6 
each agreement is an autonomous agreement, relating to different matters and including its own institutional 
provisions. No framework agreement exists. 
The main aspects of the Overland Transport Agreement are summarised as follows:
19
 
- General Provisions: Part I of the treaty includes a number of general principles. Apart 
from the principle of free choice of mode of transport which shall be discussed later,
20
 
the principle of non discrimination stated in Art. 1 (3) OTA counts among the most 
important: According to Art. 1 OTA the Agreement ensures free access to each other’s 
transport market for the carriage of passengers and goods by road and rail and an 
efficient management of the traffic. Within the scope of the agreement, direct and 
indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality are prohibited.  
- Harmonisation of weight limits and technical standards: The second part of the 
Agreement (Art. 5 ff. OTA) refers to weight limits and technical standards. The 
provisions deal with the admission to the occupation of professional road hauliers, 
with social standards (notably driving time and rest period) and certain technical 
regulations (such as vehicle control and vehicle dimensions). The stepwise increase of 
the weight limit from 28 t to 40 t in 2005, and the adoption of allowed taxes and 
contingents (for a transition period) for 40 t vehicles are of particular importance. To 
coordinate transport policy the Agreement defines a (maximum) level for taxes and the 
contingents for a transition period in Part IV. The level is mandatory; therefore it is 
neither possible to digress to the top (as far as taxes are concerned) nor to the bottom 
(as far as contingents are concerned).  
- Free access to railway and transit rights and the standards for railway companies 
are object of Part III of the Agreement (Art. 23 ff. OTA). 
- Coordinated Transport Policy: Part IV of the Agreement (Art. 30 ff. OTA) deals 
with the following aspects: 
- The (maximum) level of taxes for a transit through Switzerland has been 
determined for the reference travelling distance Basel-Chiasso.
21
 The level is  
binding for Switzerland (Art. 40 OTA). In turn, the European Union is obliged 
to develop a system for charges on its territory, reflecting the costs arising from 
the use of infrastructure and the “user-pays” principle (Art. 41 OTA). The 
imprecise wording of the provision, however, may lead to the conclusion that it 
does not provide a precise and enforceable obligation for the EU. 
- Switzerland is obliged to build the NEAT (a new alpine transversal, including 
also the new rail tunnels Gotthard and Lötschberg); vice versa the EU obliges 
itself to ensure the North- and South-access to the NEAT.  
- The number and the costs of empty drives (that do not pay a PRTHV) are 
scrutinized.  
- The contracting parties oblige themselves to supporting measures such as the 
custom clearance.  
                                                 
19
 Cf. Astrid Epiney/Reto Gruber, “Das Landverkehrsabkommen Schweiz – EU. Überblick und erste 
Bewertung“, URP/DEP 1999, 597 et seq.; Kaspar Sollberger/Astrid Epiney, Verkehrspolitische 
Gestaltungsspielräume der Schweiz auf der Grundlage des Landverkehrsabkommens, Stämpfli, Bern, 
2001; Kaspar Sollberger, Konvergenzen und Divergenzen im Landverkehrsrecht der EG und der Schweiz. 
Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des bilateralen Landverkehrsabkommens , Universitätsverlag 
Freiburg Schweiz, 2003, 177 et seq.  
20
  Cf. IV.4.a). 
21
 And therefore indirectly the PRTHV-rate (leistungsabhängige Schwerverkehrsabgabe). See below III. 
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- Safeguard precautions shall aim at a more effective handling in crisis 
situations.  
- The final provisions (Art. 49 ff. OTA) are explained in Part V of the Agreement. They 
regulate the procedure for dispute settlement, the period of validity of the agreement, 
further development of laws and the implementation of the agreement.  
It is noteworthy that the Agreement explicitly mentions the „Principle of free choice of 
mode of transport“ twice. It is the first time that the principle was integrated into a legally 
binding agreement, although its legal consequences seem rather limited:  
- Art. 1 (2) OTA defines the principle in relation to the general principles and 
objectives of the Agreement as follows:  „The provisions of the Agreement and their 
application are based on the principles of reciprocity and free choice of mode of 
transport.”  The principle as such is not legally binding. Art. 1 (2) OTA highlights that 
the provisions of the Agreement and their application should be governed by that 
principle. Therefore, the principle may be considered as having an interpretative 
character at most. 
- According to Art. 32 OTA the measures to reach the objectives for the coordinated 
transport policy
22
 of the contracting parties, mentioned in Art. 30 OTA
23
 should  
comply in particular
24
 with the “principle of free choice of mode of transport”. Due to 
the merely interpretive character of the principle
25
 and its potential to create a conflict 
with Art. 6 TCE (now Art. 11 TFEU) its legal consequence seems to be limited to the 
respect for the principle of proportionality – which must be respected anyway – and to 
the impossibility to prohibit  a certain mode of transport alltogether.
26
  
III. The performance related toll on heavy goods vehicles – PRTHV 




 2001 Switzerland charges a performance-related toll on heavy goods 
vehicles (PRTHV).27 The toll is a combination of a fiscal and a steering-tax. The PRTHV is 
supposed to cover the costs of road use and other external costs28 caused by heavy weight 
traffic. The toll is also supposed to contribute to the improvement of rail-traffic in relation to 
road traffic. With a few exceptions all transport vehicles of a total weight of more than 3,5 t 
are charged on the entire Swiss road network. The charges depend on the maximum 
                                                 
22
 Art. 31 (1) OTA: „To this end, the Contracting Parties shall take measures designed to ensu re healthy 
competition between and within the various modes of transport and to facilitate the use of more 
environmentally sound means of transporting passengers and goods.“ 
23
 Art. 30 (1) OTA: „The Contracting parties have agreed to develop, as and where necessary, a coordinated 
transport policy covering passengers and goods. The aim of this policy is to combine transport systems 
efficiency with environmental protection so as to ensure sustainable mobility.” 
24
  Other principles are also mentioned. Concerning the legal reach of Art. 32 OTA see Astrid Epiney/Kaspar 
Sollberger, Zum Gestaltungsspielraum der Vertragsparteien: die rechtliche Tragweite des Art. 32 des 
Abkommens über den Güter- und Personenverkehr auf Schiene und Straße, in: Daniel Felder/Christine 
Kaddous (eds.), Accords bilatéraux Suisse – UE (Commentaires) / Bilaterale Abkommen Schweiz – EU 
(Erste Analysen), Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Bâle/Genève/Munich, 2001, 521 et seq. 
25
  Astrid Epiney, “Der „Grundsatz der freien Wahl des Verkehrsträgers“ in der EU: rechtliches Prinzip oder 
politische Maxime?“, ZUR 2000, 239 et seq. (239-240). 
26
  Epiney, ZUR 2000 (note 25), 244-245; Epiney/Sollberger (note 24), 530 et seq. 
27
  Cf. Bundesgesetz vom 19.12.1997 über eine leistungsabhängige Schwerverkehrsabgabe, SR 641.81.  
28
  The definition of external costs is disputed. As to the question whether “traffic jam costs” are part of 
external costs cf. Jennifer Heuck, “Zur Internalisierung von Staukosten“, AJP 2010 (forthcoming). 
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permissible weight of the vehicle and the driven kilometres. The toll may also be calculated 
according to the emission and the consumption rate of the vehicle.29  
The introduction of the PRTHV should be seen in relation with Art. 84 of the Swiss Federal 
Constitution (so called “Alpine Initiative”) and with reference to the fiscal management of the 
Overland Transport Agreement30:  
- On February 20, 1994, the Swiss population and parliament adopted the Alpine 
Initiative. Art. 84 (3) of the Federal Constitution prohibits the increment of the transit 
capacities in the alpine region. Exceptions are only permitted for bypass-roads to reduce 
transit traffic. The provisions are substantiated by national law.31 According to this law 
four road sections in Switzerland are classified as „Transit roads“32. Only these roads are 
affected by the target-ceiling of the transit-road capacities.  The law also enumerates the 
measures for increases in capacity. The reconstruction of a road shall be permitted, if it 
is in the primary interest of preserving and improving traffic security. Therefore, the 
obligation of Art. 11 of the Transport Protocol of the Alpine Convention to ban the 
construction of new large-capacity roads for transalpine traffic is adequately taken into 
account.   
 In addition to the prohibition of capacity-increment, Art. 84 (2) of the Federal 
Constitution provides that the border-to-border road traffic shall be relocated to the rail 
within 10 years. The provision may be considered as the core element of the article. It 
contributes to reduce environmental problems caused by road traffic. At first glance, the 
legal consequences of the regulation were unclear. The EU argued that the article 
breaches the OTA. The legal implication to use the rail is in contradiction with the 
principle of non-discrimination and the principle of free choice of mode of transport.  
The obligation predominantly concerns the freight transport crossing the Alps and 
therefore foreign protractors. Therefore, an indirect discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality might exist. However, in view of international law, the provision does not 
indicate an absolute ban on driving.33 On the contrary, the provision does not retain a 
conditional behavioural norm, but should be understood in an ultimate way. The 
obligation clearly points to a result-oriented obligation within a certain timeframe. The 
choice of appropriate means to reach the result is left to the discretion of the legislator. 
Art. 84 (2) of the Federal Constitution should therefore be interpreted as an intention to 
relocate the freight traffic from the road to the rail, at least to the extent of  border-to-
border transport. The year 1994 with 650’000 freight journeys through Switzerland per 
year is referred to as baseline.   
 In combination with other instruments including the capacity increase of the rail and its 
subsidisation, the PRTHV shall attain this objective by means of steering the carriers’ 
behaviour into a certain direction. However, the goal of a maximum of 650’000 alpine 
crossing journeys per year still seems to be a distant prospect.34 
                                                 
29
  Cf. to the PRTHV e.g. Giovanni Danielli/Markus Maibach, Schweizerische Verkehrspolitik, Rüegger 
Verlag, Zürich, 2007, 58 et seq.; Alain Griffel, in: Georg Müller (ed.), Schweizerisches 
Bundesverwaltungsrecht, vol. IV, Verkehrsrecht, Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag, Basel, 2003, A, para. 46-
47; Sollberger, Konvergenzen und Divergenzen (note 19), 59 et seq. 
30
  II.2. 
31
  Cf. Bundesgesetz über den Strassentransitverkehr im Alpengebiet vom 17.6.1994, SR 725.14. 
32
  San Bernardino, Gotthard, Simplon and Grosse Sankt Bernhard.  
33
  Cf. Astrid Epiney/Reto Gruber, Verkehrspolitik und Umweltschutz in der Europäischen Union, 
Universitätsverlag Freiburg Schweiz, 1997, 187 et seq., cf. also Bundesamt für Justiz, VPB 1995 II 217 et 
seq. 
34
  With further references, Rolf H. Weber, “Alpentransitbörse im europarechtlichen Fadenkreuz“, AJP 
2008, 1213 et seq. (1213-1214). 
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- The fiscal management of the Overland Transport Agreement provides for a 
„compensation“ for the permitted maximal vehicle weight from 28 t to 40 t. Switzerland 
is allowed to charge a distance-dependant toll (as well as an alpine transit tax which, 
however, has so far not been charged). The maximum level of the toll is determined by 
the OTA. Switzerland is not allowed to increase the toll unilaterally. 
A toll such as the PRTHV is in accordance with the polluter-pays principle. It can also be 
considered compatible with the requirements of EU law that are legally binding for 
Switzerland: The PRTHV is charged on all vehicles on Swiss roads and does not penalise in 
fact foreign vehicles and companies. Therefore it can be considered compatible with the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality.35  
It may however be questioned, whether or not the PRTHV complies with EU secondary 
legislation, and Directive 1999/62 on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of 
certain infrastructures36 in particular. Dir. 1999/62 – which in 2006 was subject to important 
modifications especially in relation to the admissibility of tolls and user charges for the use of 
certain infrastructure37 – intends to eliminate or reduce distortions of competition between 
transport hauliers of different Member States that have different levy systems.38 The directive 
regulates – next to the harmonisation of the vehicle taxes in the Member States39 – the 
conditions under which Member States can charge tolls and user taxes in road traffic (the 
scope of the directive is, however, limited to freight transport vehicles of 3,5 t40).  Art. 2 lit. b 
and lit. c Dir. 1999/62 defines a „toll“ as a specified amount of fee payable for a vehicle 
travelling a given distance. The amount shall be calculated from the distance travelled and the 
type of vehicle used. In contrast, a „user charge“ specifies the payment that confers the right 
for a vehicle to use an infrastructure for a given period. Therefore, a “user-charge” is time-
related. 
After revision of Dir. 1999/62 the PRTHV should beyond any doubt41 be in conformity with 
the „space-based“ toll: According to Art. 7 (1) Dir.1999/62 the directive is limited to tolls and 
user charges on the trans-European network, or on parts of that network. Member States may, 
however, introduce other tolls and user charges on other roads, provided that they respect the 
principles of the Treaty, and the principle of non-discrimination in particular. It is worth 
mentioning, that according to Art. 7 (9) Dir. 1999/62 tolls are based on the „principle of the 
recovery of infrastructure costs“. This means that the weighted average tolls are related to the 
construction costs and operating costs, maintaining and developing the infrastructure network 
concerned. Manifestly (other) external costs shall not be included in the calculation. Art. 7 
(10) Dir. 1999/62 indicates certain exceptions from this principle. As a result, Member States 
are to a large extent permitted to include other external costs in the calculation of the toll in 
                                                 
35
  It is questionable whether the obligation to install a tachograph necessary for charging the toll can be 
considered as a discrimination of foreign vehicles. It seems that foreign vehicles are more concerned by 
this obligation. Therefore we may assume an indirect discrimination of foreign transport hauliers based on 
their nationality. They would have to carry the costs even for a journey of a very short distance, whereas 
Swiss transport hauliers would profit from a long term investment. The obligation to install a tachograph 
may, however, be justified with a legitimate public interest. There is no evidence for a breach of the 
principle of proportionality.  
36
  Dir. 1999/62 on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructure, OJ 1999 L 187, 
42  last modified by  Dir. 2006/103, OJ 2006 L 363, 344.  
37
  Cf. Dir. 2006/38, OJ 2006 L 157, 8. Concerning these changes see Walter Obwexer, “Die „neue“ 
Wegekosten-Richtlinie“, ecolex 2005, 663-664.  
38
  Cf. Recital 1 of Dir. 1999/62.  
39
  An item to be settled that is not indicated in the title of the directive. In our context this aspect of the 
directive is not important. 
40
  Art. 1 in conjunction with Art. 2 lit. d Dir. 1999/62.  
41
  Concerning the situation before the revision cf. Astrid Epiney, Straßenbenutzungsgebühren und 
europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, Liber Amicorum Gerd Winter, Groningen/Amsterdam, 2003, 87 et seq. 
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the trans-European network. Art. 7 (11) Dir. 1999/62 also offers the possibility to add a mark-
up on infrastructure in mountain regions.   
IV. The Alpine Transit Bourse (ATB)42 
In Switzerland there is an intensive debate about the introduction of the „Alpine Transit 
Bourse” (ATB). Its idea is to limit the number of freight alpine transits by introducing a 
trading scheme of certificates for transalpine freight traffic on the road.43 In December 2008, 
the Swiss parliament adopted a federal law on the relocation of the transalpine traffic of heavy 
goods vehicles from the road to the rail (Bundesgesetz über die Verlagerung des 
alpenquerenden Güterschwerverkehrs von der Straße auf die Schiene [GVVG])44. By 2019 
transalpine transports of heavy goods vehicles on the road shall be gradually reduced to 
650’000 journeys per year.45 The objective shall be accomplished with the introduction of the 
ATB. The ATB, however, will require implementing legislation which may be subject to a 
referendum. The Federal Council is requested to hold negotiations with the EU and the 
neighbouring countries on this matter.46 The negotiations seem to be necessary, because the 
introduction of an ATB can only be successfully implemented after conciliation with the other 
alpine states and the EU. From a legal point of view, an ATB would – as will be shown later47  
– not comply with the OTA: in regards to the OTA an additional agreement between the EU 
and the alpine states is therefore required. The question arises if the ATB can and should be 
introduced as a market-based instrument to (partly) solve the problems linked to the 
transalpine freight transport on the road.   
In the following we discuss the question to what extent the ATB – as currently planned by 
Switzerland – is compatible with legal disciplines of EU law. A distinction shall be drawn 
between EU primary and secondary legislation (2. and 3.) and the OTA (4.). The analysis 
departs from the delineation of the system of the ATB (1.).  
1. The mechanism of the Alpine Transit Bourse  
The idea of the ATB48 consists in limiting the number of alpine transits of heavy goods 
vehicles by introducing a quantitative ceiling and a principle of „cap and trade“. Heavy goods 
vehicles with a weight above 3,5 t shall be in possession of an alpine transit-right (ATR) on 
road-passes for which an ATR is foreseen with compulsory force.49 A certain amount of 
alpine transit entities (ATE) shall allow the acquisition of an ATR, for which the exchange 
rate50 needs to be fixed in advance. The ATR shall be granted for a specific vehicle to give 
                                                 
42
  This chapter is in most parts based on Astrid Epiney/Jennifer Heuck, “Zur Verlagerung des 
alpenquerenden Straßengüterverkehrs auf die Schiene: die „Alpentransitbörse“ auf dem Prüfstand des 
europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts“, ZUR 2009, 178 et seq.  
43
  Cf. in detail IV.1. 
44
  Cf. the ‚message’  of the Federal Council in BBl. 2007, 4377, 4509.  
45
  Cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 4/12/2008.  
46
  Cf. NZZ, 4/12/2008.  
47
  Cf. IV.4. 
48
  The system of the ATB has been delineated from a description of an expertise enquired from various 
Federal Offices. The expertise analysed the technical and practical feasibility of the ATB, Cf. Bundesamt 
für Raumentwicklung (ed.), Alpentransitbörse. Untersuchung der Praxistauglichkeit, 2007, René 
Neuenschwander, Urs Springer (Project-team Ecoplan), Matthias Rapp, Stefan Loewenguth, Andrea Felix 
(Project-team RAPP Trans AG) and Kurt Moll, the expertise can be downloaded at: www.are.admin.ch.  
49
  In Switzerland they shall be according to Art. 2 STVG (Bundesgesetz über den Straßentransitverkehr im 
Alpengebiet/Federal Law on the road transit traffic in the alpine region, SR 725.14): San Bernardino, 
Gotthard, Simplon, Großer St. Bernhard. 
50
  The exchange rate may be calculated considering various conditions. It can be fixed while taking into 
account various circumstances. The number of ATEs for an ATR can, for instance, differ from one 
vehicle type to another (e.g. emission categorie). 
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right to cross the road-pass in one direction within a certain timeframe, unless unpredictable 
incidents of the system such as accidents and natural catastrophes occur.   
The allocation of the ATEs can be free of charge or proceed by sale for a fixed charge or in 
the framework of an auction on a regular basis. Currently, preference is given to the auction 
based system.51 After the first purchase the ATE may be freely exchanged on the market, as 
long as it is allocated to a vehicle as ATR. However, the possibility may be given to change 
the ATR into ATE at any time.  
The local and short distance traffic – defined by distance52– is subject to specific rules. If one 
would apply the same market costs for the alpine transits, the costs for short distant trips 
would be significantly above those of long-distance trips. For the implementation of the 
special treatment it has been suggested to reduce the number of ATEs for an ATR, whereby a 
different exchange rate would be applied.  
2. Primary EU Law 
The ATB could be in conflict with Art. 34 TFEU and Art. 18 TFEU. We shall not analyse 
subsidiary law, which may primarily be relevant in the context of the use of revenue of an 
ATE-auction.53  
a) Art. 34 TFEU 
According to Art. 34 TFEU quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having 
equivalent effect are principally prohibited54 – unless they are legally justified55. Quantitative 
restrictions are all measures which amount to a total or partial restraint of, according to the 
circumstances, imports, exports or goods in transit.56 Measures having an equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions are those (state) measures „which are capable of hindering, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade“57 (Dassonville-Formula). As such, 
all measures that have a negative impact on the trade of goods between Member States fall 
under the scope of Art. 34 TFEU. This implies a free circulation of all goods that are legally 
produced and sold in one Member State.58 Art. 34 TFEU is, however, not applicable according 
to the Keck-jurisdiction59, if the national provision is restricting or prohibiting certain “selling 
arrangements”, so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the 
national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the 
marketing of domestic products and of those form other Member States. The details of a 
factual limitation of Art. 34 TFEU are disputed, even though the ECJ provided certain 
indications in its latter case-law.60 
                                                 
51
  See Weber, AJP 2008 (note 34), 1213.  
52
  The maximum distance of the local traffic is 40 km on both sides of the road-pass. For the short-distance 
traffic the maximum distance is 150 km, see Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung, ATB (note 48), 91.  
53
  As to the missing relevance of the application of Art. 110 TFEU see Epiney/Heuck, ZUR 2009 (note 42), 
178, 180. 
54
  Cf. with further references, Astrid Epiney, in: Roland Bieber/Astrid Epiney/Marcel Haag, Die 
Europäische Union. Europarecht und Politik, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 8. Aufl., 2009, § 11, no. 34 et seq.  
55
  Cf. further below in the text.  
56
  Cf.  ECJ, 2/73 (Geddo), ECR 1973, I-865, para. 7; see also ECJ, 124/85 (Commission/Greece), ECR 
1986, I-3935, para. 3 et seq. 
57
  ECJ, 8/74 (Dassonville), ECR 1974, I-837, para 5.  
58
  Explicitely in ECJ 120/78 (Rewe-Zentral AG), ECR 1979, I-649, para. 8 (Cassis de Dijon). 
59
  ECJ, comb. C-267/91 and C-268/91 (Keck), ECR 1993, I-6097.  
60
  With reference to other case-law Epiney, in: Die Europäische Union (note 54), § 11, para. 40 et seq. 
Kommentar [hj2]: Fussnote inhaltlich 
überprüfen. EuGH hat das an dieser Stelle 
so nicht « ausdrücklich » gesagt.  
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The Alpine Transit Bourse seems to have an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction. It 
would render the movement of products more expensive and more difficult, thereby fulfilling 
the conditions of the Dassonville-formula.61  
It may, however, be questioned whether the conditions of the Keck-jurisdiction are fulfilled. If 
they are, the ATB must be qualified as a measure concerning selling-arrangements, so that 
Art. 34 TFEU would not apply.62 It may be argued that the ATB is not product-related 
because it is meant to regulate the transport of goods, in particular the limitation and the 
increase in costs of freight road transport in specific regions, rather than the product mobility 
and therefore the traffic of goods. As such the ATB is comparable with traffic regulations 
(speed limits, single traffic lane a.o.), that cannot be assessed under the scope of Art. 34 
TFEU.63  
More convincing arguments, however, suggest the application of Art. 34 TFEU: The objective 
of the ATB is to limit quantitatively a mode of transport (road-traffic) on certain roads. From 
a technical point of view, the roads concerned are of utmost importance and can hardly be 
bypassed. A limitation of the traffic of goods will go along with this objective, since the 
transport cannot be carried out if the haulier is not in possession of an ATR. Therefore the 
ATB is not only setting out the traffic-rules but is traffic-regulating. It has a direct effect on 
the attitude of trade partners to deliver their goods using a certain system of transportation. 
Thus, Art. 34 TFEU is applicable.64  
This raises the critical question about the justification of the ATB. According to the case law 
of the ECJ quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect – as far as 
indiscriminative measures are concerned65 – can be justified to ensure the protection of the 
environment.66 The ATB pursues the objective to reduce heavy goods vehicles on alpine 
transit routes and to contribute to relocate (partly) the transalpine freight traffic from the road 
to the rail, which is more protective of the environment. However, the measure also needs to 
be proportionate.67 The proportionality of the measure should be assessed in relation to the 
level of protection as defined by the Member States unless the European Union defines the 
level of protection.68 There can hardly be any doubt that a quantitative limitation of the 
                                                 
61
  Same conclusion Weber, AJP 2008 (note 34), 1213 (1216).  
62
  On the Keck-jurisdiction in relation to transport policy measures Astrid Epiney/Reto Gruber, 
Verkehrsrecht in der EU. Zu den Gestaltungsspielräumen der EU-Mitgliedstaaten im Bereich des 
Landverkehrs, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2001, 80 et seq. 
63
  Epiney/Gruber, Verkehrsrecht (note 62), 82. Considering the Keck-Formula in the area of transport cf. 
Karl Weber, Der Transitverkehr in der Judikatur des EuGH: Spannungsfeld zwischen 
Warenverkehrsfreiheit und Umweltschutz, in: Günter H. Roth/Peter Hilpold (eds.), Der EuGH und die 
Souveränität der Mitgliedstaaten. Eine kritische Analyse richterlicher Rechtsschöpfung auf ausgewählten 
Rechtsgebieten, Stämpfli, Bern, 2008, 395 (420 et seq.).  
64
  With the same point of view Weber, AJP 2008 (note 34), 1213 (1216). Also ECJ, C-112/00 
(Schmidberger), ECR 2003, I-5659; ECJ, C-320/03 (Commission, Germany a.o./Austria), ECR 2005, I-
9871; see also the illustration and analysis of the ECJ case law on the matter of transit traffic and user 
charges Weber, in: EuGH und Souveränität (note 63), 395 et seq. 
65
  Whether measures with direct discriminating effect can be justified with reasons of public interest cf. 
Epiney, in: Die Europäische Union (note 54), § 11, para. 58-59. 
66
  ECJ, 302/86 (Commission/Denemark), ECR 1988, I-4607; see also ECJ, C-2/90 (Commission/Belgium), 
ECR 1992, I-4431; ECJ, C-379/98 (Preussen Elektra), ECR 2001, I-2099; ECJ, C-18/93 (Corsica Ferries), 
ECR 1994, I-1783, para. 36. 
67
  In regards to the transport sector Epiney/Gruber, Verkehrsrecht (note 62), 89 et seq.; Weber, in: EuGH 
und Souveränität (note 63), 395 (416-417). From the ECJ case law see ECJ, C-463/01 
(Commission/Germany), ECR 2004, I-11705; ECJ, C-309/02 (Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft), ECR 
2004, I-11763; ECJ, C-320/03 (Commission, Germany a.o../Austria), ECR 2005, I-9871, para. 70. 
68
  ECJ, C-394/97 (Heinonen), ECR 1999, I-3599; ECJ,  C-388/95 (Belgium/Spain), ECR 2000, I-3123.  
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transalpine freight traffic on the road contributes to a reduction of negative impacts on the 
environment. As such, the ATB may be considered suitable to protect the environment.69  
The need of the ATB can be substantiated: Its objective is to quantitatively limit the 
transalpine freight transport on the road to benefit environmental protection70. In addition, less 
restrictive measures are not apparent. The ATB limits rather than prohibits freight transport. 
Every haulier who paid the toll can transport his goods on the roads that are part of the ATB-
scheme.71 However, it is worth mentioning, that according to the ECJ, hauliers who cannot or 
do not wish to purchase an ATR, need to be offered realistic alternatives of transporting their 
goods.72 One alternative could be the offer of sufficient, attractive and competitive rail 
capacities – especially in regards to the costs; in other words, the introduction of an ATB in 
all alpine countries call for coordinated rail offers. In Switzerland they already exist.73  
It can be concluded that the introduction of an ATB does fall under the scope of Art. 34 TFEU 
but that the measure is justified on the grounds of environmental protection.74  
b) Art. 18 TFEU 
Art. 18 TFEU prohibits direct or indirect75 discrimination on the grounds of nationality. The 
article could be relevant for local and short distance traffic without prejudice to other 
provisions of the treaty. Indirect discrimination could exist in the case of preferential 
treatment of transport near the alpine transit road passes. Domestic hauliers, who are 
established near the ridge of the Alps could benefit from the criteria.76 
Indirect discrimination can be justified on grounds of objective reasons. The justification 
cannot be made from the point of view of environmental protection, because the different 
treatment – other than the introduction of an ATB – does not pursue an environmental 
objective. The special treatment rather aims at reducing negative impacts for smaller 
economic and peripheral regions caused by a disproportionate increase of costs for the local 
and short distance traffic. It is questionable, whether this concern should be taken as an 
„economic reason“ according to ECJ jurisdiction. It does not justify an unequal treatment on 
the grounds of nationality. According to the ECJ economic reasons aim at steering the 
economy or pursue concerns on politico-economical grounds (especially those of a 
protectionist nature).77 Protectionist measures for economic branches in the regions do not 
qualify as a reason of justification. However, the objective of the preferential treatment of the 
                                                 
69
  ECJ, C-320/03 (Commission, Germany a.o./Austria), ECR 2005, I-9871, para 73 et seq. where the ECJ 
states that the sectoral prohibition on the movement of lorries is adopted in order to ensure the quality of 
ambient air in the zone concerned and is therefore justified on environmental protection grounds; the ECJ 
however stresses that the Austrian authorities were under a duty to examine carefully the possibility of 
using less restrictive measures and whether there are genuine alternative means of transporting the goods 
in question. 
70
  It is up to the Member States to define the level of protection, see note 68. The assessment of the 
proportionality of the measure thus is (only) a “means-ends analysis“.  
71
  Weber, AJP 2008 (note 34), 1213 (1217), states that the necessity is related to the problem of “fiscality” 
(transalpine freight transport on the road getting more expensive) rather than to the problem of 
contigency.  
72
  ECJ, C-320/03 (Commission, Germany a.o./Austria), ECR 2005, I-9871, in relation to a sectoral 
prohibition on the movement of lorries.   
73
  Weber, AJP 2008 (note 34), 1213 (1217).  
74
  On the privilege of the local and shortdistance traffic see below IV.2.b). 
75
  On the different notions Epiney, in: Die Europäische Union (note 54), § 10, para. 6.  
76
  Cf. also ECJ, C-205/98 (Commission/Austria), ECR 2000, I-7367, para. 72 et seq., referring to Dir. 99/62 
the ECJ affirms an indirect discrimination because of a different toll for short distance and long distance 
journeys at the Brennerautobahn. 
77
  ECJ, C-324/93 (Evans), ECR 1995, I-563, para. 36; ECJ, C-398/95 (Syndesmos ton Elladi Touristikon), 
ECR 1997, I-3091, para. 23.  
Kommentar [hj3]: Ich konnte diese 
Definition in den Urteilen nicht (wörtlich) 
finden 
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local and short distance traffic is not intended to strengthen the competitiveness of enterprises 
in the region concerned. The objective is rather of a nature of regional policy: peripheral 
regions on both sides of the alpine main ridge are economically closely connected. They need 
to maintain a vital link in order to safeguard the economic development of the region. The 
pursuit of a local and regional economic policy rather than the competitiveness of certain 
economic branches must be scrutinized. This is also evident from the distinguishing feature, 
which is the travelled distance rather than the place of residence or the business location of a 
haulier company. The ECJ affirmed in several cases, that measures, which on first sight seem 
to pursue an economic aim, can be justified by other (non-economic) reasons, such as to 
ensure a financial balance of the social security systems78 or to safeguard the supply of goods 
at short distance of isolated areas of Member States79. The question addresses the privilege of 
the local and short distance traffics aiming at the economic survival of peripheral regions. As 
such the pursuit of a regional economic policy can constitute a reason for justification. This is 
also shown by Art. 96 (2) TFEU that obliges the Commission to pursue an appropriate 
regional economic policy and to take into account the needs of underdeveloped areas when 
approving financial support.  
As to the proportionality of the measure the appropriateness seems undisputed: the price-
reduction for the local and short distance traffic contributes to the improvement and the 
sustainment of the regional economic development and the provisioning of the local 
population.  As regards necessity, there do not appear to exist less restrictive measures.80 
Therefore, the privileged treatment of the local and short distance traffic complies with Art. 
18 TFEU. In quantitative terms the local traffic will hardly have an important impact. 81 
3. Secondary EU Law: Directive 1999/62 
The incompatibility of the ATB with secondary EU law – and Dir. 1999/6282 in particular – 
does not prevent its introduction, because the secondary EU law can be modified. We shall 
now evaluate the need for amendment.  
The introduction of the ATB may be qualified as a toll.83 It precludes that the level of the toll 
is calculated from the travelled distance using a certain vehicle type. The toll is introduced in 
or in parts of the trans-European network (Art. 2 lit. b in compliance with Art. 7 (1) Dir. 
1999/62). It is also assumed that the alpine road-passes in the Member States are principally 
part of the trans-European Network. Art. 7 (2-12) Dir. 1999/62 provides the details on the 
admissibility of a toll and the calculation of its amount. In contrast, the ATB was developed 
from another principle that completely differs from the usual toll system: The maximum 
amount for the toll is not fixed in advance but the costs are defined by the market. Member 
states have no influence on the costs once the maximum number of transits across the road-
passes has been defined and the ATEs have been allocated or sold. The principle favours the 
                                                 
78
  ECJ, C-158/96 (Kohll), ECR 1998, I-1931, para. 41.  
79
  ECJ, C-254/98 (TK Heimdienst), ECR 2000, I-151, para. 34.  
80
  Coming to the same result, but with different dogmatic arguments, Weber, AJP 2008 (note 34), 1213 
(1222). See also ECJ, C-157/02 (Rieser Internationale Transporte), ECR 2004, I-1477, para. 37, where the 
ECJ confirms in regards to Dir. 1999/62 that specific regulations apply for border regions. In ECJ, C-
205/98 (Commission/Austria), ECR 2000, I-7367, the ECJ denied a justification of different tolls for the 
long and shortdistance traffic by interpreting the directive (in the version of the decisions’ date) as having 
an exhaustive harmonizing effect  On the directive see IV.3.  
81
  Weber, AJP 2008 (note 34), 1213 (1222). 
82
  Dir. 1999/62 on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures, OJ 1999 L 
187, 42, last modified by Dir. 2006/103, OJ 2006 L 363, 344. Cf. to this directive already III.  
83
  The qualification as a user charge does not seem to be adapted. The system would give only one right to 
travel the road-pass and in one direction only. This may be valid for a certain period of time, but it is not 
time-dependent as in the sense of Art. 2 lit. c Dir. 1999/62; it does not allow an unspecified number of 
road-pass transits within a given timeframe.  
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argument that the introduction of the ATB may not be considered as introducing a toll in the 
sense of Dir. 1999/62. This is why Dir. 1999/62, which regulates – next to the vehicle taxes 
that are not relevant here – only the toll and user charges (Art. 1 Dir. 1999/62), does not apply 
for the ATB.   
It is questionable whether Dir. 1999/62 harmonises the rules on „infrastructure costs“. In the 
affirmative only systems specified in the directive are permitted under defined prerequisites; 
whereas systems of different structure – such as the ATB – would constitute a breach from the 
beginning.  It may be argued that the introduction of other systems would undermine the 
harmonising effect of the directive. Last but not least the directive aims at an elimination of 
distortions of competition between transport companies because of different levy systems in 
the Member States. 
However, important arguments can be put forward against such a broad interpretation of the 
directive: Member States would be prohibited to introduce individual transport policy 
instruments that were generated from an approach and a basic idea different from the “usual” 
tolls and user charges. The fact that the fundamental approach for charging infrastructure 
costs has never been addressed at the European level leaves leeway to the Member States to 
develop their own concepts and instruments, as long as they respect EU primary law. It 
therefore does not appear reasonable to interpret a directive as being exhaustive and therefore 
prohibiting the introduction of other systems including those that do not fall within its scope, 
if that directive only sets out rules for a certain type of taxes with the only aim to minimize 
the distortion of competition. Any other interpretation would lead to the unjustified outcome 
that the discretion of a Member State to pursue a policy – which according to the European 
principles is part of the Member States’ competence – would be extensively restrained or even 
outright abolished. Declaring a directive as having an exhaustive effect would compromise 
the competence of the Member States.  
In sum there are good arguments that the introduction of the ATB does not fall under the 
scope of Dir. 1999/62; the ATB is not in conflict with the „ordinary“ toll and user charge 
systems because the directive does not have an exhaustive harmonising effect.  
4. Overland Transport Agreement   
The following provisions of the OTA could be primarily important to the ATB: the principle 
of „free choice of mode of transport“ (a), the prohibition of quantitative restrictions (b), the 
principle of non-discrimination (c), the principle of proportionality of the charged costs (d) as 
well as the fiscal provisions of the agreement (e). 
a) Legal consequences of the principle of „free choice of mode of transport“  
According to Art. 1 (2) OTA the agreement is based on the principle of free choice of mode of 
transport. According to Art. 32 indent 2 OTA transport policy measures must comply with 
this principle. The legal consequences of the principle are, however, not further described by 
the OTA. Furthermore such a principle is unknown to EU law.84 Even when admitting a 
certain legal effect of the principle – which for itself is already more than doubtful – it could 
only be understood as a right to choose between the use of different, already existing traffic 
infrastructures. The choice could, however, be restricted under the premise that the principle 
of proportionality is duly respected.85 It is apparent that the principle has no individual legal 
                                                 
84
  The term is used in certain statements of the Commission Astrid Epiney, “Der „Grundsatz der freien 
Wahl des Verkehrsträgers“ in der EU: rechtliches Prinzip oder politische Maxime? “, ZUR 2000, 239 et 
seq. 
85
  Also Weber, AJP 2008 (note 34), 1213 (1215). 
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relevance that would go beyond the principle of proportionality.86 Therefore, the principle is 
not in conflict to the introduction of the ATB.87 
b) The prohibition of unilateral quantitative restrictions  
The aim of the prohibition of unilateral quantitative restrictions (Art. 32 indent 3 OTA) seems 
to be the durable opening of the transport market.88 In connection with the scope of the 
Agreement (Art. 2 OTA) Switzerland and the EU are obliged to renounce to undertake 
measures that could quantitatively limit the access to the transport market. 
As in Art. 34 TFEU89, measures that would normally fall within the scope of the provision 
can, however, be justified on grounds of general public interest. 90 Since an incompatibility of 
the ATB with Art. 32 indent 3 OTA cannot be assumed one can refer to the reflections 
developed under Art. 34 TFEU above.91 
c) Principle of non discrimination 
Art. 1 (3) OTA prohibits any discrimination on the grounds of the nationality. Art. 32 OTA 
refers to this principle in the context of traffic related measures, explicitly enumerating the 
prohibited discrimination criteria. The legal consequences of the principle stated in the OTA 
can be considered the same as in EU law92, since Art. 18 TFEU also prohibits the 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Therefore it can again be referred to the 
discussion above. 93     
d) Principle of proportionality in the imposition of charges relating to transport costs   
With the introduction of the ATB, charges will be imposed to the transalpine freight traffic on 
the road, provided the principle of proportionality (Art. 32 OTA) is respected. For the 
application of the principle three aspects should be distinguished:94  
- Intramodal aspect: in accordance with the polluter-pays principle the costs imposed to 
different vehicle types of the same mode of transport have to be in proportion to the 
actual costs caused by a given vehicle type. There seems to be a priori no indication 
why the costs imposed on an ATR should not be in accordance with the polluter-pays 
principle and why one does not make a differentiation on the grounds of objective 
criteria. A market mechanism seems to be an appropriate and efficient instrument for 
charging costs, because the ATEs necessary to purchase an ATR may vary according to 
the type of vehicle.   
- Intermodal aspect: all traffic carriers should be charged the costs they cause. Again there 
seems to be no indication why the ATB should lead to a non-respect of the principle of 
proportionality.95 
                                                 
86
  Cf. Epiney/Sollberger, in: Bilaterale Abkommen (note 24), 521 (530 et seq.); also Weber, AJP 2008 (note 
34), 1213 (1215); Sollberger, Konvergenzen und Divergenzen (note 19), 55-56.  
87
  Also Weber, AJP 2008 (note 34), 1213 (1215).  
88
  Cf. Epiney/Sollberger, in: Bilaterale Abkommen (note 24), 521 (534); as well as Weber, AJP 2008 (note 
34), 1213 (1220-1221). 
89
  Cf. Sollberger, Konvergenzen und Divergenzen (note 19), 338-339; Weber, AJP 2008 (note 34), 1213 
(1214). 
90
  Cf.  Epiney/Sollberger, in: Bilaterale Abkommen (note 24), 521 (535 et seq.); as well as Weber, AJP 2008 
(note 34), 1213 (1221). 
91
  Cf. IV.2.a).  
92
  Cf.  Epiney/Sollberger, in: Bilaterale Abkommen (note 24), 521 (528). 
93
  Cf. IV.2.b). 
94
  Cf. in general Epiney/Sollberger, in: Bilaterale Abkommen (note 24), 521 (538 et seq.). 
95
  Also Weber, AJP 2008 (note 34), 1213 (1221), who mentions that the OTA envisages the subsidisation of 
the rail and that the contracting parties therefore wish to privilege the rail.  
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- Finally there seems to be no indication that the introduction of an ATB breaches the 
principle of proportionality between the costs that were caused and the imposed charges, 
since Art. 37 OTA seems to allow taking into account all external costs.96  
As a conclusion, the principle of proportionality does not provide for a quantifiable criteria 
with regards to the extent of costs caused by the traffic. It must, however, be made sure that 
the charges introduced by the ATB for the transit of an Alpine pass are in accordance with the 
polluter-pays principle. All external costs can be included to calculate the actual costs that are 
created by the road user. The cost recovery must also be considered for rail traffic. Admittedly 
difficult questions may come up about the origin of different emerging costs. Nevertheless, it 
should be possible to provide some kind of proof or plausibility calculation within the 
discretion conceded by the provision.   
e) Fiscal regulations of the OTA and the prohibition of quota limitation 
The question whether Switzerland is allowed to take a charge on transalpine freight transports 
on roads was pivotal in the negotiations of the Agreement. The Agreement provides for a 
maximum charge for the „reference distance“ between Basel and Chiasso (300 km). The final 
treaty regime (40 t limit, no quota limitations of alpine transits and a maximum user charge on 
the road) came into effect on January 1st, 2005 (see Art. 40 (4) OTA).97 The Agreement does 
not only define a maximum tax rate but also the composition of the tax: The charges 
differentiate on the one hand according to categories of emission standards and the travelling 
distance; on the other hand they are partly made up by toll fees for the use of specialised 
Alpine infrastructure (Art. 40 (5) OTA). This part can constitute up to 15 % of the maximum 
amount of the charges.  
The maximum charge for an alpine transit as determined by the OTA is compulsory.98 
Switzerland is not allowed to charge higher fees for the transalpine traffic than defined by the 
OTA.99  
The compelling conclusion is that the ATB will only be compatible with the OTA, if the 
charges correspond to the (reasonable) amount as defined by the OTA. The assessment is not 
affected by the procedure (either free of charge for the first allocation or by the means of an 
auction).100 In an auction, the state sells the ATE for the best bid, which would be coherent 
with a tax for the alpine transit road. In case of an allocation free of charge the first customer 
will not be charged. However, all other partners on the market would have to pay the market 
price for an ATE to the first customer. This is why we can still talk about a charge imposed by 
the state – even though the first customer has been privileged.101 It cannot be argued that the 
state does not impose charges because the first allocation is issued without tax and that the 
trade with CO2-certificates is equally not qualified as a “tax”.
102 The system of the ATB 
automatically leads to the situation that costs will be charged for the transalpine traffic and 
that their amount can and most certainly will not correspond to the upper level as defined by 
                                                 
96
  Cf. Epiney/Sollberger, in: Bilaterale Abkommen (note 24), 521 (539-540). 
97
  On tax charges see in detail Sollberger, Konvergenzen und Divergenzen (note 19), 304 et seq.; 
Epiney/Gruber, URP/DEP 1999 (note 19), 597 (609 et seq.); Sollberger/Epiney, Verkehrspolitische 
Gestaltungsspielräume (note 19), 36 et seq.  
98
  On protection clauses that are not relevant as regards the ATB see Epiney/Gruber, URP/DEP 1999 (note 
19), 597 (612 et seq.).  
99
  Cf.  Sollberger/Epiney, Verkehrspolitische Gestaltungsspielräume (note 19), 62-63. 
100
  A free allocation would however lead to a certain amount of practical and economic problems (the 
demand would be much higher than the offer); see also Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung, ATB (note 48), 
96-97. 
101
  Coming to the same result Weber, AJP 2008 (note 34), 1213 (1217 et seq.). Other point of view 
Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung, ATB (note 48), 223-224. 
102
  Representing this point of view Bundesamt für Raumentwicklung, ATB (note 48), 223. 
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Art. 40 (4) OTA. This would, however, undermine the objective and contents of that article: A 
system that exceeds the maximum limits of road toll is in contradiction with the OTA. 
As the ATB is derived from the market principle, the costs of an ATE may fluctuate 
according to the demand. The introduction of maximum costs for an ATE will put the whole 
system into question. It can be assumed that the costs of an ATE will very often be above 
rather than below the (low) maximum level defined by Art. 40 (4) OTA.  
Moreover, the OTA does not justify a deviation from the maximum road toll for the reference 
distance for reasons of the protection of the environment. Such an interpretation would be in 
contradiction with the evolutionary history of the Agreement – otherwise the definition of a 
maximum fee would no longer make sense. This is why the introduction of an ATB should be 
considered as contrary to a road tax regime as provided for by the OTA. 
In addition to this, Art. 8 (6) OTA on the transitional arrangement governing the weight of 
vehicles provides that all vehicles having the technical standards laid down in the second 
paragraph of Article 7 (3) OTA shall be exempt from any quota or authorisation agreements 
with effect from January 1st, 2005. This provision together with the additional paragraphs of 
Art. 8 OTA (that define the maximum number of alpine transits), the general context of the 
Agreement and the principle of prohibition of quota restrictions in particular can only be 
interpreted as stating that a quota for alpine transits is prohibited. Since it is the intention of 
the ATB to introduce a quota it would equally constitute a breach of the OTA.   
V. Conclusion 
A major problem of the European Transport Law seems to be the inability of the EU and its 
Member States to agree on effective instruments that are able to reduce road traffic. One 
reason for this is certainly that many Member States have not created or do not apply 
instruments with a sufficiently promising impact such as road taxation. This situation causes 
problems in the Alpine region because of its specific geographical und ecological features.  
Instruments to improve the protection of the Alpine region seem, however, achievable. The 
question arises whether the Alpine Convention may provide a platform for the development 
and the promotion of these instruments and for the assessment of their legal implications in 
order to ensure an effective protection of the Alpine region from continuously increasing 
traffic. Instruments which deal with individual traffic and not only transport of goods could 
also be considered.  
 
 
  
